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DEATH PENALTY: AN OVERDUE
EXEMPTION FOR THE SEVERELY
MENTALLY ILL
JOSEPHINE MARINO*
I.

INTRODUCTION

A Texas man shaved his head, dressed in camouflage, and
carried an armed sawed-off shotgun and a deer rifle as he went to
his parents-in-law’s home.1 He shot them at close range in front of
his wife and three-year-old daughter.2 He then kept his wife and
daughter hostage in a bunkhouse where he had been living and
only released them to safety after a lengthy standoff with the
police.3 A Texas jury convicted him of capital murder and
sentenced him to death.4
Now consider a man who has suffered from severe mental illness
for over thirty years.5 His judgment is severely impaired, and his
thinking and perception are profoundly disturbed.6 He has been
diagnosed with chronic undifferentiated schizophrenia and
schizoaffective disorder and has been prescribed antipsychotic
medication to alleviate some of his symptoms while his auditory
and visual hallucinations only exacerbate his delusions of
paranoia and grandiosity.7 He is unable to overcome the delusions,
and he believes that he is engaged in spiritual warfare with Satan
as his psychotic religiosity takes over.8
*J.D. Candidate, St. John’s University, School of Law, Class of 2016.
1 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Panetti v. Stephens, No. 13-8453, 2014 WL 3687250,
at *5 (5th Cir. 2014)
2 Panetti v. Stephens, 727 F.3d 398, 400 (5th Cir. 2013).
3 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at *6.
4 Id.
5 Id. at *3.
6 Id. at *4.
7 Id.
8 Id. at *4-5.
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These two stories are both true. These frightening realities
describe the actual realities of one man, Scott Panetti. In the first
story describing Panetti’s crime, Panetti is a cold-hearted
murderer. In the second story describing his complex and unstable
mental history, Panetti is a man tormented by the mysterious and
dark workings of his mind. When the two are blended together,
the heartbreaking tale of Scott Panetti is created with many
victims – his parents-in-law, his wife, his daughter, his parents,
and even Panetti himself.
“The death penalty is the gravest sentence our society may
impose” and “[p]ersons facing that most severe sanction must have
a fair opportunity to show that the Constitution prohibits their
execution.”9 Over the years, the Supreme Court has refused to
inflict the death penalty on several groups of individuals because
doing so would be a clear and gross violation of the Constitution’s
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.10 These exempted groups
include juvenile offenders,11 intellectually disabled offenders,12
and insane offenders.13
However, no such exemption has been created for offenders who
are severely mentally ill. In fact, in 2015, Scott Panetti petitioned
the Supreme Court for review of his capital sentence whereby he
claimed that he was severely mentally ill and argued that
executing the severely mentally ill is a violation of the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause.14 In denying the petition for review,
the Supreme Court gave no explanation or indication for the
reasons behind its denial.15 Without any detailed insight from the
Supreme Court and an approximation that between twenty
percent of all individuals on death row suffer from severe mental
illness, it is more than likely that more appeals on behalf of other

9 Hall v. Florida, 134 S.Ct. 1986, 2001 (2014).
10 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. (stating “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor

excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted”).
11 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005).
12 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
13 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 399 (1986).
14 Panetti v. Texas, No. 14–7312, 2015 WL 133411 at *1 (U.S. June 12, 2015). Panetti’s
petition for writ of certiorari to determine whether he cannot be executed due to severe
mental illness was denied.
15 Id. “Petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas denied.”
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severely mentally ill individuals on death row will be made in the
near future.16
This Note takes the position that an exemption for severely
mentally ill offenders from the death penalty is not only
warranted, but also long overdue. Part I will use the Supreme
Court’s own opinion in Hall v. Florida to make the argument that
the Supreme Court has theoretically carved out such an exemption
in its prior opinions, which it must now follow. This Note heavily
relies on Hall for two reasons. First, in Hall, the Court was
addressing intellectually disabled offenders and much of its
opinion can be applied to severely mentally ill offenders. Second,
the Court delivered the Hall opinion in 2014. It is the most recent
death penalty opinion, and its expressed ideas of punishment are
consistent with the Court’s earlier exemption-creating death
penalty cases, which are used throughout the opinion and its
antecedents.
Part II will concentrate on the absence of the three principle
rationales justifying punishment when executing an intellectually
disabled offender, and how such an absence equally exists when a
severely mentally ill offender is executed. Further, this Note will
use the Hall opinion to demonstrate how the Supreme Court
deferred to mental health professionals and the medical
community when reaffirming the exemption for intellectually
disabled offenders and how such deference is warranted for
creating an exemption for severely mentally ill offenders.
Part III will focus on the Supreme Court’s “evolving standard of
human decency” test that it has created specifically for death
penalty cases. This Note will provide two examples – one domestic
and one international – as evidence demonstrating society’s
overall reluctance on executing offenders with mental illness.
These examples show that executions of the severely mentally ill
violate the “evolving standards of human decency” test,
demanding that the Supreme Court create an exemption for the

16 Id. This estimate is from Mental Health America; the association is formerly known
as National Mental Health Association. Mental Health America, Position Statement 54:
Death
Penalty
and
People
with
Mental
Illness,
http://www.mentalhealthamerica.net/positions/death-penalty (last visited Oct. 23, 2016).
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severely mentally ill from the death penalty on the grounds of the
Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.17
Part IV will revisit the Supreme Court’s opinions in both Ford
v. Wainwright and Hall, taking an in depth look at the state’s
procedures used in those cases and the reasons for holding that
such procedures were unconstitutional. The Supreme Court has
left the task of developing execution and sentencing procedures to
the states and, using both Ford and Hall, this Note will provide
some guidance on the minimum procedures that the Supreme
Court should require for states in assessing severe mental illness,
satisfying the Eighth Amendment.
II.

LEGAL PRECEDENT CARVES OUT AN EXEMPTION FOR THE
SEVERELY MENTALLY ILL

A. Three Principle Justifications for Punishment
As mentioned above, the Supreme Court has carved out several
exemptions from capital punishment for particular groups of
individuals.18 Throughout these opinions, the Court has laid out
the principle justifications for punishment, which have become its
template when deciding the constitutionality of capital
punishment. As recently as 2014, the Court, yet again, resorted
to this template in Hall.19 There, the Court reaffirmed its holding
in Atkins v. Virginia, which created an exemption for intellectually
disabled offenders by throwing out Florida’s threshold IQ cut off
to determine death penalty eligibility.20 It found that “no
17 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 551 (2005) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101
(1958)).
18 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 575 (stating that juvenile offenders cannot constitutionally be
given the death penalty); see also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (holding that for the intellectually
disabled, a death penalty sentence is excessive); see also Ford, 477 U.S. at 410 (stating that
the Eighth Amendment prohibits states from inflicting the death penalty upon insane
offenders).
19 Hall, 134 S.Ct. at 1990 (finding that where Hall and his accomplice kidnapped, beat,
raped, and murdered their pregnant twenty-one-year-old victim, in addition to robbing a
convenience store and shooting the sheriff’s deputy, the death penalty, as applied to Hall
was an unconstitutional punishment because of Hall’s intellectual disability).
20 Hall, 134 S.Ct. at 2001; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321:
Our independent evaluation of the issue reveals no reason to disagree with the judgment
of ‘the legislatures that have recently addressed the matter’ and concluded that death is
not a suitable punishment for a mentally retarded criminal. We are not persuaded that the
execution of mentally retarded criminals will measurably advance the deterrent or the
retributive purpose of the death penalty. Construing and applying the Eighth Amendment
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legitimate penological purpose is served by executing a person
with intellectual disability.”21 Further, it stated that to do so
contravenes the Eighth Amendment, “for to impose the harshest
of punishments on an intellectually disabled person violates his or
her inherent dignity as a human being.”22
In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court identified the three
principle rationales justifying punishment – rehabilitation,
deterrence, and retribution – which we have seen throughout its
death penalty opinions.23 First, the Supreme Court reasonably
and logically conceded that rehabilitation is not an applicable
rationale for the death penalty.24 Second, it noted that the premise
of the deterrence rationale is not served by executing those that,
because of their condition, are “unable to make calculated
judgments” and have “‘diminished ability’ to ‘process information,
to learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, or to
control impulses . . . [which] make[s] it less likely that they can
process the information of the possibility of execution as a penalty
and, as a result, control their conduct based upon that
information.’”25 Last, the Supreme Court reasoned that retributive
values are not fulfilled by executing those who have diminished
capacity, which “lesse[ns] [their] moral culpability and, hence, the
retributive value of the punishment.”26 Thus, no justification for
punishment is served by executing individuals who “by definition
. . . have diminished capacities to understand and process
information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn

in the light of our ‘evolving standards of decency,’ we therefore conclude that such
punishment is excessive and that the Constitution ‘places a substantive restriction on the
State’s power to take the life’ of a mentally retarded offender.
21 Hall, 134 S.Ct at 1992 (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317, 320). After Atkins was decided,
Hall filed a motion claiming that he had an intellectual disability and, therefore, he could
not be executed. When Florida held a hearing to consider his motion, Hall again presented
evidence of his intellectual disability, including an IQ test score of 71. In response, Florida
argued that its law required that, as a threshold matter, Hall show an IQ score of 70 or
below before he could present any additional evidence of his intellectual disability, so
therefore, he could not be found intellectually disabled.
22 Id. at 1992.
23 Id. (citing Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420 (2008)).
24 Hall, 134 S.Ct. at 1993.
25 Id. (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320).
26 Hall, 134 S.Ct. at 1993 (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319) (“If the culpability of the
average murderer is insufficient to justify the most extreme sanction available to the State,
the lesser culpability of the mentally retarded offender surely does not merit that form of
retribution.”).
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from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control
impulses, and to understand the reactions of others, because these
individuals bear “diminish[ed] . . . personal culpability” and there
is no retributive value gained from their execution.27
The three principle justifications for punishment that the
Supreme Court concluded were not served by executing
intellectually disabled offenders in Hall – high culpability,
effective deterrence, and rehabilitation – which are also absent
when a severely mentally ill offender is executed.28 First, as the
Court pointed out in Hall, rehabilitation does not apply to the
death penalty.29 Second, the death penalty does not deter
offenders who suffer from severe mental illness.30 Because a
severely mentally ill offender is unable to assess reality, he is also
unable to be deterred by possible punishments like the death
penalty.31
Finally, the severely mentally ill have reduced culpability.32
Offenders who suffer from delusions and other effects of severe
mental illness are unable to fully comprehend their actions and
the consequences of those actions.33 Although these offenders may
have committed some of the most horrific crimes, scholars still
argue that the characteristics of severe mental illness make these
defendants less culpable than defendants without severe mental
illnesses.34Such characteristics include the inability to conform
one’s actions to society’s moral standards, the lack of
understanding that one’s actions are wrong, and continuing to
commit the crime because of one’s illness.35
Additionally, the Supreme Court has considered the impact of
the trial process from a defendant’s condition. The risk of unfair
27 Hall, 134 S.Ct. at 1999 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318).
28 Lise E. Rahdert, Hall v. Florida and Ending the Death Penalty for Severely Mentally

Ill Defendants, 124 YALE L.J. 34, 38 (2014).
29 Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1992–93 (2014).
30 Id. at 1993 (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. 304, 320 (2002)); see Lyn Entzeroth, The
Challenge and Dilemma of Charting a Course to Constitutionally Protect the Severely
Mentally Ill Capital Defendant from the Death Penalty, 44 AKRON L. REV. 529, 549 (2011).
31 Rahdert, supra note 28, at 38.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 38 n.31 (citing Entzeroth, supra note 30, at 556 (“noting that severe mental
illnesses such as schizophrenia’ can disable and deprive their victims of rational thought
processes and control,’ and citing relevant psychological research.”).
34 Rahdert, supra note 28, at 38.
35 Id.
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trial is present for severely mentally ill offenders because, like
intellectually disabled offenders, they are unable to effectively
participate in their own defense.36 The Supreme Court has even
recognized that, prior to the imposition of bans on executing
juveniles and the intellectually disabled, jurors viewed the
defendant’s youth or intellectual disability as making him “more
dangerous and deserving of death.”37 In Hall, the Supreme Court
held that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on executing the
intellectually disabled “protect[s] the integrity of the trial
process.”38The trial process is similarly compromised with the
execution of severely mentally ill offenders, and therefore, a ban
on executing them must be imposed.39
Therefore, because the reasons for exempting the intellectually
disabled “apply equally to profoundly mentally ill defendants, it is
both unjustifiable and inconsistent for the Court to allow those
with a severe mental illness to be executed.”40 No purpose is
served by executing individuals who suffer from severe mental
illness and without purpose, the punishment is cruel, unusual,
and hence, unconstitutional.41

36 Id. at 38-39 (citing Entzeroth, supra note 30, at 558) (noting that a mentally ill
defendant is less able to “assist in his defense, make rational legal decisions, or adequately
advise his lawyer about meaningful defenses.”).
37 Entzeroth, supra note 30, at 546.
38 Rahdert, supra note 28, at 40.
39 Id. at 40.
40 Id. at 38 (citing Enzteroth, supra note 30, at 557-58; Christopher Slobogin, Mental
Illness and the Death Penalty, 1 CAL. CRIM. L. REV 3 (2000) (discussing various arguments
for preventing mentally ill defendants with psychoses from being executed).
41 Outside the scope of this Note, but important to consider, is the argument raised by
Judge Price of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas. While supporting the premise of this
Note by saying “I can imagine no rational reason for carving a line between the prohibition
on the execution of a mentally retarded person or an insane person while permitting the
execution of a severely mentally ill person,” his argument is a broader one. He argues that,
“carving out another group that is ineligible for the death penalty is a band aid solution for
the real problem. Evolving societal values indicate that the death penalty should be
abolished in its entirety.” This argument is based on the idea of human error. “[S]ociety is
now less convinced of the absolute accuracy of the criminal justice system.” “[B]ecause the
criminal justice system is run by humans, it is naturally subject to human error.” Therefore,
“[t]here is no rational basis to believe that this same type of human error will not infect
capital murder trials. Ex parte Panetti, No. WR–37,145–04, 2014 WL 6974007, at *1-2
(Price, J., dissenting). Although Judge Price makes a compelling argument, this Note
agrees with the former part of his dissenting opinion but declines to embrace the position
in the latter because abolishment of the death penalty does not seem to be in the near
horizon.
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B. The Court’s Deference to Mental Health Professionals
In Hall, the Supreme Court acknowledged how it has, along with
state courts and legislatures, consulted and learned from medical
experts in the past.42 In the context of mental health, the Supreme
Court cites to these professionals because they use their expertise
to study and assess the consequences of the classification schemes
used in diagnosing mental or psychiatric disorders or
disabilities.43 Further, the Supreme Court noted that society relies
upon this medical and professional expertise, which only
highlights the importance of the medical community and how
proper the Supreme Court thinks their influence is.44
Once again, the Court’s deference to the mental health
professionals in Hall and the context of intellectual disability
equally applies in the context of severe mental illness. Similar to
death penalty cases involving intellectually disabled offenders, the
medical and legal communities have come together to oppose the
death penalty for individuals with severe mental illness. The
arguments mirror one another and are outlined below.
The American Psychiatric Association (the “APA”) is an
organization composed of psychiatrists “working together to
ensure humane care and effective treatment for all persons with
mental disorders . . . .”45 The APA is extensively cited by the
Supreme Court in Hall and mentioned in Roper v. Simmons,
where the Supreme Court carved out the exemption for juvenile
offenders.46 Part of the APA’s mission is to “promote the highest
quality care for individuals with mental disorders” and to
“promote psychiatric education and research.”47
In particular, the APA is cited for its Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (“DSM”), which is a diagnostic system
and manual used by psychiatrists and other experts as well as the

42
43
44
45

Hall, 134 S.Ct. at 1993.
Id.
Id.
Mission,
Vision,
and
Values,
AM.
PSYCHIATRIC
ASS’N,
https://www.psychiatry.org/about-apa/vision-mission-values-goals (last visited Oct 23,
2016).
46 Hall, 134 S.Ct. at 1988, 1994, 2000. In fact, a majority of the Court’s citations were
direct quotes from the amici curiae brief submitted by the APA.
47 Mission, Vision, and Values, supra note 45.
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Supreme Court.48 The DSM considers Axis I diagnoses the most
serious or severe disorders, including schizophrenia and other
psychotic disorders, mania, major depressive disorder, and
dissociative disorders.49 All of these disorders are serious because
they are typically associated with delusions, hallucinations,
extremely disorganized thinking, or very significant disruption of
consciousness, memory, and perception of the environment.50 Axis
I diagnoses constitute what is considered “severe mental illness.”
Accompanied by the APA, the American Psychological
Association, the National Alliance on Mental Illness, and the
American Bar Association (“ABA”) have joined “a widening chorus
of professionals calling for a halt to death sentences and executions
for defendants with severe mental disorders, which ‘significantly
impaired’ their rational judgment or capacity to appreciate the
wrongfulness of their conduct.”
Recently, the ABA made several recommendations for cases
where a criminal defendant, who suffers from a severe mental
illness, faces the death penalty. In its Recommendation and
Report on the Death Penalty and Persons with Mental Disabilities
(the “Recommendation”), the ABA recognizes that Atkins “offered
a timely opportunity to consider the extent, if any, to which other
types of impaired mental conditions ought to lead to exemption
from the death penalty.”51
The ABA strongly urges every jurisdiction that imposes capital
punishment to adopt its guidelines and created the Task Force on
Mental Disability and the Death Penalty.52 The Task Force is
composed of both lawyers and mental health professionals,
including members of the APA and the American Psychological
Association.53
The Task Force guidelines urge strongly against executing or
sentencing a defendant to death who, at the time of the offense,
48 Hall, 134 S.Ct. at 1990. There are different editions of the manual. The Hall Court
cites to both the DSM-IV and DSM-V, which suggests that both have significance and
authority.
49 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL, 25-26 (4th ed. 2000).
50 Id. at 275-76 (schizophrenia), 301 (delusional disorders), 332-33 (mood disorder with
psychotic features), 125 (delirium), 477 (dissociative disorders).
51 Recommendation and Report on the Death Penalty and Persons with Mental
Disabilities, 30 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 668, 669 (2006).
52 Id.
53 Id.
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was under a severe mental disorder. More specifically, the ABA
provides:
Defendants should not be executed or sentenced to death if,
at the time of the offense, they had a severe mental disorder
or disability that significantly impaired their capacity (a) to
appreciate the nature, consequences or wrongfulness of
their conduct, (b) to exercise rational judgment in relation
to conduct, or (c) to conform their conduct to the
requirements of the law. A disorder manifested primarily by
repeated criminal conduct of attributable solely to the acute
effects of voluntary use of alcohol or other drugs does not,
standing alone, constitute a mental disorder or disability for
purposes of this provision.54
The ABA explains that this section is “meant to prohibit
execution of persons with severe mental disability whose
demonstrated impairments of mental and emotional functioning
at the time of the offense would render a death sentence
disproportionate to their culpability.”55 In explaining the rationale
behind this section, the ABA cites the reasons behind the holding
in Atkins, and more specifically, the absence of the three principle
justifications for punishment previously discussed.56
Further, the ABA clarifies that its Recommendation is meant to
reach offenders who have a “‘severe’ disorder or disability, one
roughly equivalent to disorders that mental health professionals
would consider the most serious ‘Axis I diagnoses.’”57 The ABA
explains that other conditions that are not technically an Axis I
condition may also classify as “severe” in its Recommendation, but
“only if these more serious symptoms occur at the time of the

54 Id. at 670.
55 Id. at 672 (emphasis added).
56 Id. (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318-19) (“More specifically . . . [the Atkins Court] held

that people with mental retardation who kill are both less culpable and less deterrable than
the average murderer, because of their ‘diminished capacities to understand and process
information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to
engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others.’
As the Court noted, ‘[i]f the culpability of the average murderer is insufficient to justify the
most extreme sanction available to the State, the lesser culpability of the mentally retarded
offender surely does not merit that form of retribution.’ Similarly, with respect to
deterrence, the Court stated, ‘[e]xempting the mentally retarded from [the death penalty]
will not affect the ‘cold calculus that precedes the decision’ of other potential murderers.”).
57 Recommendation and Report on the Death Penalty and Persons with Mental
Disabilities, supra note 51, at 670.
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capital offense would the predicate for this Recommendation’s
exemption be present.”58 The purpose of this section of the ABA’s
Recommendation is to make sure that its exemption only applies
to “offenders less culpable and less deterrable than the average
murderer” and does so by “further requir[ing] that the disorder
significantly impair cognitive or volitional function at the time of
the offense.”59
The ABA explains the types of offenders that this provision is
meant to protect. Section (a) would apply to “offenders who,
because of severe disorder or disability, did not intend to engage
in the conduct constituting the crime or were unaware they were
committing it” and “offenders who intended to commit the crime
and knew that the conduct was wrongful, but experienced
confusion and self-referential thinking that prevented them from
recognizing its full ramifications.”60 Section (b) would apply to
offenders with “the type of disoriented, incoherent and delusional
thinking that only people with serious mental disability
experience.”61 Last, Section (c) would probably apply to offenders
who “experience significant cognitive impairment at the time of
the crime.”62
The ABA continues to set guidelines for these criminal
defendants exhibiting severe mental illness in the conviction
process. It provides certain grounds for precluding execution:
A sentence of death should not be carried out if the prisoner
has a mental disorder or disability that significantly
impairs his or her capacity (i) to make a rational decision to
forgo or terminate post-conviction proceedings available to
challenge the validity of the conviction or sentence; (ii) to
understand or communicate pertinent information, or
otherwise assist counsel, in relation to specific claims
bearing on the validity of the conviction or sentence that
cannot be fairly resolved without the prisoner’s
participation; or (iii) to understand the nature and purpose

58
59
60
61
62

Id.
Id. at 671.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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of the punishment, or to appreciate the reason for its
imposition in the prisoner’s own case . . . .63
In addition, the ABA continues to set forth guidelines for cases
involving prisoners seeking to forgo or terminate post-conviction,
cases involving prisoners unable to assist counsel in postconviction proceedings, and cases involving prisoners unable to
understand the punishment or its purpose.64
Therefore, it is readily apparent that both the legal and medical
communities have strived to emphasize the injustice and
immorality that come from executing individuals with severe
mental illness. In fact, the Supreme Court’s template based on the
three principle rationales for punishment are central themes to
the APA’s and ABA’s definitions of severe mental illness, as well
as the ABA’s Recommendation. Further, these are the precise
communities that should be given deference by the Supreme Court
in determining an exemption for the severe mentally ill as it has
in the past for the currently exempted groups.
III.

THE EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY

Also, evident in these exemption-creating opinions is the
Supreme Court’s reliance on “‘the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society’ to determine which
punishments are so disproportionate to be ‘cruel and unusual.’”65
The Supreme Court professes its duty to strike down law that
“contravenes our Nation’s commitment to dignity” and that
“den[ies] the basic dignity that the Constitution protects.”66

63 Recommendation and Report on the Death Penalty and Persons with Mental
Disabilities, supra note 51, at 671.
64 Id. at 668.
65 Roper, 543 U.S. at 551 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 101). “Not bound by the
sparing humanitarian concessions of our forebears, the Amendment also recognizes the
‘evolving standards of decency that marks the progress of a maturing society.’” Ford, 477
U.S. at 406 (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 101). “Construing and applying the Eighth
Amendment in the light of our ‘evolving standards of decency,’ we therefore conclude that
such punishment is excessive and that the Constitution ‘places a substantive restriction on
the State’s power to take the life’ of a mentally retarded offender.” Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321
(quoting Ford, 477 U.S. at 405). “Florida’s law contravenes our Nation’s commitment to
dignity and its duty to teach human decency as the mark of a civilized world.” Hall, 134
S.Ct. at 2001.
66 Hall, 134 S.Ct. at 2001.
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Few, if any, would argue that executing severely mentally ill
offenders meets any standard of decency, or that doing so is what
marks the United States as a mature society. In fact, society has
begun to not only move away from the idea of executing severely
mentally ill offenders, but rather, is actively seeking that it is
prohibited to do so.
A poll released in December 2014 found that Americans oppose
the death penalty for individuals suffering from mental illness by
a margin of 2 to 1.67 Public Policy Polling conducted this
nationwide poll, which consisted of a survey of 943 registered
voters.68 The survey found that 58% of respondents would oppose
the death penalty for individuals suffering from mental illness.69
Remarkably, the opposition is very evenly distributed. First, the
“opposition was consistent across all political parties – 62% of
Democrats, 59% of Republicans, and 51% of Independents.70
Second, opposition was also consistent across all regions of the
country” – 64% from the Midwest, 61% from the West, and 55%
from both the South and Northeast.71 Last, “opposition to the
death penalty for persons” suffering from mental illness was
“strong across both genders and all income and education levels.”72
Robert Smith, an assistant law professor at the University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill commissioned this survey.73 He
stated that this poll carries great significance as new research,
which shows an “emerging consensus against using capital
punishment in cases where the defendant is mentally ill.”74
Further, “[t]he poll joins other new data demonstrating that
sentencing trends are down across the country for death-eligible
defendants with severe mental illness. Combining this public
polling, sentencing practices, and the recommendations of the
67 Press Release, Laura Burstein, New Nationwide Poll Shows Americans Oppose
Death Penalty in Cases where Person has Mental Illness By 2-1 Margin (Dec. 1, 2014)
(available at https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B1LFfr8Iqz_7RDJBZzA2NGJzWG8/view).
68 Id. This survey “was conducted on November 24-25, 2014 and has a margin of error
of +/- 3.1.”
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Press Release, Laura Burstein, New Nationwide Poll Shows Americans Oppose
Death Penalty in Cases where Person has Mental Illness By 2-1 Margin (Dec. 1, 2014)
(available at https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B1LFfr8Iqz_7RDJBZzA2NGJzWG8/view).
74 Burstein, supra note 67.
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mental health medical community, it is clear that a consensus is
emerging against the execution of a person like Scott Panetti, who
suffers from a debilitating illness which is similar to intellectual
disability in that it lessens both his culpability and social value of
his execution.”75
Amnesty International is an organization that advocates for
prisoners and people at risk “whose human rights have been
violated or are under threat of violation.”76 One of the areas of
focus for Amnesty International is the death penalty and mental
illness specifically in the United States. In fact, its webpage
features a quote by Yvonne Panetti, mother of Scott Panetti, where
she stated, “He did a terrible thing, but he was sick. Where is the
compassion? Is this the best our society can do?”77
Amnesty International reports provide the international
standard of human decency in one report, stating that “[t]he
execution of those with mental illness or ‘the insane’ is clearly
prohibited by international law. Virtually every country in the
world prohibits the execution of people with mental illness.”78
However, the United States, as recently as early 2014, has
executed individuals with long histories of severe mental illness,
along with India, Japan, and Pakistan.79 For support, Amnesty
International lists findings of international resolutions. First, in
1997, the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or
Arbitrary Executions found that governments continue to use the
death penalty “with respect to . . . the mentally ill are particularly
called upon to bring their domestic legislation into conformity with
international legal standards.”80 Second, in 2000, the UN
Commission on Human Rights urged all states that still maintain

75 Id.
76 Prisoners and People at Risk, AMNESTY INT’L, http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-

work/issues/prisoners-and-people-at-risk (last visited Mar. 1, 2015).
77 Death Penalty and Mental Illness, AMNESTY INT’L, http://www.amnestyusa.org/ourwork/issues/death-penalty/us-death-penalty-facts/death-penalty-and-mental-illness (last
visited Mar. 1, 2015).
78 Id.
79 2014 World Day Against the Death Penalty: Protecting People with Mental and
Intellectual Disabilities from the Use of the Death Penalty, AMNESTY INT’L (Oct. 2014),
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/4000/act510052014en.pdf.
80 Death Penalty and Mental Illness, supra note 77.
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the death penalty “not to impose it on a person suffering from any
form of mental disorder; not to execute any such person.”81
The two examples above demonstrate how both the domestic
community and the international community are strongly against
executing severely mentally ill offenders. Therefore, an exemption
must be created for these individuals because society’s standards
have clearly evolved away from executing them. Under its own
test, the Supreme Court must do away with punishments that are
not in conformity with its evolving human decency standard.
IV.

PROPOSED EXEMPTION

Because of the Supreme Court’s own precedent, an exemption is
warranted for severely mentally ill offenders facing the death
penalty. Some of the Supreme Court’s opinions in exemptioncreating death penalty cases have considered at-length state tests
for death penalty eligibility. This section of the Note examines the
procedures for assessing mental illness and offers some key
guidance.
A. Ford v. Wainwright
In Ford v. Wainwright, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he
Eighth Amendment prohibits the State from inflicting the penalty
of death upon a prisoner who is insane.”82 There, the question
before the Supreme Court was whether the Florida district court
was obligated to hold an evidentiary hearing on the question of the
habeas corpus petitioner’s sanity.83 At the time, Florida law
directed the governor to stay the execution and appoint a
commission of three psychiatrists when informed that a person
under the sentence of death may be insane.84 More specifically,
Florida law provided that “[t]he examination of the convicted
person shall take place with all three psychiatrists present at the
same time.”85 “After receiving the report of the commission, the
Governor must determine whether ‘the convicted person has the
81
82
83
84
85

Id.
Ford, 477 U.S. at 410.
Id.
Id. at 412.
Id.
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mental capacity to understand the nature of the death penalty and
the reasons why it was imposed on him’ and “if the Governor finds
that the prisoner has that capacity, then a death warrant is issued;
if not, then the prisoner is committed to a mental health facility.
The procedure is conducted wholly within the executive branch, ex
parte, and provides the exclusive means for determining sanity.”86
The reports of the three examining psychiatrists reached
conflicting diagnoses but the same ultimate finding of
competency.87 Petitioner’s counsel attempted to submit other
written materials to the governor, including reports of two other
psychiatrists who examined his client in greater detail.88
However, the governor did not inform counsel whether his
submission would be considered and subsequently made his
decision by issuing a death warrant.89
The Supreme Court found that Florida’s procedural review
“fail[ed] to achieve even the minimal degree of reliability required
for the protection of any constitutional interest . . . .”90 The
Supreme Court noted several deficiencies in Florida’s procedure.
First, the procedure failed to include the prisoner in the “truthseeking process” and to acknowledge the “Court’s longstanding
pronouncement that ‘[t]he fundamental requisite of due process of
law is the opportunity to be heard.’”91 Further, “[i]n all other
proceedings leading to the execution of an accused, [the Supreme
Court] has said that the factfinder must ‘have before it all possible
relevant information about the individual defendant whose fate it
must determine.”92 A procedure that “precludes the prisoner or his
counsel from presenting material relevant to his sanity or bars
86 Id. at 412.
87 Id.
88 Ford, 477 U.S. at 413. One of petitioner’s psychiatrists concluded that petitioner was

not competent to be executed.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 411-13. The Supreme Court also found that the procedure in place fell short
of the adequacy under Townsend. “The adequacy of a state-court procedure under
Townsend is largely a function of the circumstances and the interests at stake. In capital
proceedings, generally, this Court has demanded that fact-finding procedures aspire to a
heightened standard of reliability (citation omitted). This especial concern is a natural
consequence of the knowledge that execution is the most irremediable and unfathomable of
penalties; that death is different (citation omitted).”
91 Id. at 413 (quoting Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914)).
92 Ford, 477 U.S. at 413 (quoting Jurek v. Tex., 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976) (plurality
opinion)).
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consideration of that material by the factfinder is necessarily
inadequate.”93 Additionally, “the minimum assurance that the
life-and-death guess will be a truly informed guess requires
respect for the basic ingredient of due process, namely, an
opportunity to be allowed to substantiate a claim before it is
rejected.”94
In the context of mental illness, the Supreme Court recognized
that because “‘psychiatrists disagree widely and frequently on
what constitutes mental illness [and] on the appropriate diagnosis
to be attached to given behavior and symptoms,’ the factfinder
must resolve differences in opinion within the psychiatric
profession ‘on the basis of the evidence offered by each
party. . . .’”95 It further noted that “[t]he same holds true after
conviction; without any adversarial assistance from the prisoner’s
representative-especially when the psychiatric opinion he proffers
is based on much more extensive evaluation than that of the stateappointed commission—the factfinder loses the substantial
benefit of potentially probative information. The result is a much
greater likelihood of an erroneous decision.”96
The second deficiency the Supreme Court found in Florida’s
procedure was the inability to challenge or impeach the opinions
of the psychiatrists appointed by the state.97 The Supreme Court
then suggested that cross-examination of the psychiatrists or
something less formal to that extent because it would “contribute
markedly to the process of seeking truth in sanity disputes by
bringing to light the bases for each expert’s beliefs, the precise
factors underlying those beliefs, any history of error or caprice of
the examiner, any personal bias with respect to the issue of capital
punishment, the expert’s degree of certainty about his or her own
conclusions, and the precise meaning of ambiguous words used in
the report.”98 The Court further stated that some questioning of
the experts concerning their technical conclusions is needed
otherwise “a factfinder simply cannot be expected to evaluate the
various opinions particularly when they are themselves
93
94
95
96
97
98

Ford, 477 U.S. at 414.
Id. (quoting Solesbee v. Balkcom, 399 U.S. 9, 23 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
Ford, 477 U.S. at 414 (quoting Ake v. Okla., 470 U.S. 68, 81 (1985)).
Ford, 477 U.S. at 414.
Id. at 415.
Id.

MARINO, MACRO (DO NOT DELETE)

11/8/2017 2:34 PM

100 JOURNAL OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT Vol. 30:1

inconsistent.”99 The Supreme Court feared that there would be a
“significant possibility that the ultimate decision made in reliance
on [state] experts will be distorted” under Florida’s procedure
which failed to provide the prisoner’s representative with the
opportunity to clarify or challenge the state experts’ opinions or
methods.100
The third and “most striking defect” in Florida’s procedure was
the placement of the ultimate decision “wholly within the
executive branch.”101 Florida’s procedure provided that the
governor appointed the experts and ultimately decided whether
the state could carry out the death sentence that it has sought. 102
The Supreme Court found this especially troublesome because the
governor’s subordinates were responsible for “initiating every
stage of the prosecution of the condemned from arrest through
sentencing.”103 Therefore, neutrality was wholly absent from the
procedure, which is absolutely necessary for reliability in the factfinding proceeding.104
While it left the task of developing constitutional procedures to
the states, the Supreme Court eloquently stated that:
[T]he lodestar of any effort to devise a procedure must be
overriding dual imperative of providing redress for those
with substantial claims and of encouraging accuracy in the
fact-finding determination. The stakes are high and the
‘evidence’ will always be imprecise. It is all the more
important that the adversary presentation of relevant
information be as unrestricted as possible. Also essential is
that the manner of selecting and using the experts
responsible for producing that “evidence” be conducive to
the formation of neutral, sound, and professional judgments
as to the prisoner’s ability to comprehend the nature of the
penalty. Fidelity to these principles is the solemn obligation
of a civilized society.105

99
100
101
102
103
104
105

Id.
Id.
Ford, 477 U.S at 416.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 417.
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B. Hall v. Florida
In 2002, the Supreme Court ruled in Atkins v. Virginia that the
Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of the intellectually
disabled.106 As a result of Atkins, Hall filed a motion claiming that
he had an intellectual disability and, therefore, he could not be
executed.107 When Florida held a hearing to consider his motion,
Hall again presented evidence of his intellectual disability,
including an IQ test score of 71.108 In response, Florida argued
that its law required that, as a threshold matter, Hall show an IQ
score of 70 or below before he could present any additional
evidence of his intellectual disability; therefore, he could not be
found intellectually disabled.109 The Florida Supreme Court
rejected Hall’s appeal and held that Florida’s IQ cutoff was
constitutional.110
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the Florida statute at
issue was unconstitutional.111 It threw out Florida’s threshold IQ
test by holding that “the law requires that [Hall] have the
opportunity to present evidence of his intellectual disability,
including deficits in adaptive functioning over his lifetime” and
that Florida’s statute was invalid under the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause of the Constitution.112
On its face, the Florida statute was consistent with both the
views of the medical community and Atkins; nothing in the
statute’s text precluded recognition of a defendant’s IQ score as a
range as mental health professionals do.113 However, the Florida
Supreme Court interpreted the statute more narrowly and “held
that a person whose [IQ] test score is above 70, including a score
106 Hall, 134 S.Ct. at 1991; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
107 Hall, 134 S.Ct. at 1991-92.
108 Id. at 1992. The Court notes that Hall had nine IQ evaluations with scores ranging

between 60 and 80. The sentencing court excluded two scores below 70 for evidentiary
reasons. Therefore, the court only considered the scores between 71 and 80.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 2001.
113 Hall, 134 S.Ct. at 1994. The Florida statute defined intellectual disability for
purposes of an Atkins proceeding as “significantly sub-average general intellectual
functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during
the period from conception to age 18.” It further defines “significantly sub-average general
intellectual functioning” as “performance that is two or more standard deviations from the
mean score on a standardized intelligence test.”
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within the margin for measurement error, does not have an
intellectual disability and is barred from presenting additional
evidence asserting the argument that he is so disabled.”114
The Supreme Court found that through its interpretation,
Florida “[went] against the unanimous professional consensus.”115
Further, it stated that states must “afford these test scores the
same studied skepticism that those who design and use the tests
do, and understand that an IQ test score represents a range rather
than a fixed number.”116 Finally, the Supreme Court declared
that:
The death penalty is the gravest sentence our society may
impose. Persons facing that most severe sanction must have
a fair opportunity to show that the Constitution prohibits
their execution. Florida’s law contravenes our Nation’s
commitment to dignity and its duty to teach human decency
as the mark of a civilized world. The States are laboratories
for experimentation, but those experiments may not deny
the basic dignity the Constitution protects.117
C. Guidelines for Determining a Defendant’s Severe Mental
Illness
The Supreme Court has left the task of developing the exact
procedures for executing sentences to the states.118 In the context
of determining eligibility for the death penalty for defendants
claiming severe mental illness, the states should be guided by Ford
and Hall. Additionally, there are a few procedures that the
Supreme Court not only look for but also require.
First, a state’s procedure for determining eligibility for the death
penalty for defendants claiming severe mental illness must
include the defendant in the process by allowing him and his
representatives to set forth any materially relevant information
about his mental health. This would provide the factfinder with
all the information needed to make the ultimate decision of death
penalty eligibility, including evidence of mental health
114
115
116
117
118

Id.
Id. at 2000.
Id. at 2001.
Hall, 134 S.Ct. at 2001.
Ford, 477 U.S. at 416-17.
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professionals who may disagree with one another. It is the
factfinder’s job to resolve such disagreements. Further, allowing
the defendant to offer evidence that he deems materially relevant
will also allow him to provide a more extensive evaluation of his
mental health that may be more in depth than that done by the
state.
Second, such a procedure must include a way for the defendant
to challenge evaluations done by the state. When a defendant
makes such a challenge, the evaluating psychiatrist should be
required to disclose the process of his evaluations including the
basis of his evaluation, exact factors used in the evaluation,
history or risk of error in the evaluation, and response to any
ambiguity claimed in the evaluation. Furthermore, the evaluating
psychiatrist should be required to submit an affidavit providing
for any personal bias in relation to the death penalty along with
his confidence in the conclusions found by the evaluation.
Third, the procedure should have a separation between the
authority charged with the ultimate decision of death penalty
eligibility and the authority of appointing psychiatric experts to
determine the defendant’s mental health status. Finally, the
evaluation done by the state should conform to the customary
standards and norms of the usual procedures and methods
employed by the mental health community.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has established several exemptions from
the death penalty for qualifying individuals. These individuals
include juveniles, the insane, and the intellectually disabled.119
However, it has failed thus far to establish an exemption for
individuals suffering from severe mental illness.
These
individuals are so vulnerable that they are unable to defend
themselves from the government’s harshest form of punishment.
In addition, the three principle rationales that justify punishment
– deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution – are completely
absent from executing the severely mentally ill. Furthermore, the

119 Roper, 543 U.S. at 575; Ford, 477 U.S. at 399; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
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Supreme Court has used these three principle rationales
extensively in the opinions that have created such exemptions.120
Combining the evolving decency standard along with the Court’s
notion that it is the ultimate decision maker, I urge the Court to
create the overdue exemption for severely mentally ill offenders.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly asserted its role as the
Judiciary by stating that “the Constitution contemplates that in
the end [its] own judgment will be brought to bear on the question
of the acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth
Amendment”121 and that the “exercise of independent judgment is
the Court’s judicial duty.”122 However, in failing to do so, the
Supreme Court has undermined its own authority and
independent judgment as the evolving standards of decency, along
with the medical and legal communities, which relentlessly urge
it to act.

120 “First, there is a serious question whether either justification underpinning the
death penalty—retribution and deterrence of capital crimes—applies to mentally retarded
offenders. As to retribution, the severity of the appropriate punishment necessarily depends
on the offender’s culpability. If the culpability of the average murderer is insufficient to
justify imposition of death (citation omitted) the lesser culpability of the mentally retarded
offender surely does not merit that form of retribution. As to deterrence, the same cognitive
and behavioral impairments that make mentally retarded defendants less morally culpable
also make it less likely that they can process the information of the possibility of execution
as a penalty and, thus, control their conduct based upon that information. Nor will
exempting the mentally retarded from execution lessen the death penalty’s deterrent effect
with respect to offenders who are not mentally retarded. Second, mentally retarded
defendants in the aggregate face a special risk of wrongful execution because of the
possibility that they will unwittingly confess to crimes they did not commit, their lesser
ability to give their counsel meaningful assistance, and the facts that they are typically
poor witnesses and that their demeanor may create an unwarranted impression of lack of
remorse for their crimes.” Atkins, 536 U.S. at 305 (citing Godfrey v. Ga., 446 U.S. 420, 433
(1980); “Once juveniles’ diminished culpability is recognized, it is evident that neither of
the two penological justifications for the death penalty—retribution and deterrence of
capital crimes by prospective offenders (citation omitted) provides adequate justification for
imposing that penalty on juveniles.” Roper, 543 U.S. at 553.
121 Hall, 134 S.Ct. at 1999-2000 (quoting Coker v. Ga., 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977)
(plurality opinion)).
122 Hall, 134 S.Ct. at 2000 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 564).

